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论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2017-10-15

发表刊物：PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS

收录刊物：SCIE、EI、Scopus

卷号：484

页面范围：336-344

ISSN号：0378-4371

关键字：Evolution of cooperation; Fixation probability; Fixation time; One-third rule

摘要：A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The onethird rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.