点击次数：

发布时间：2019-03-09

论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2015-01-07

发表刊物：JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

收录刊物：Scopus、PubMed、SCIE

卷号：364

页面范围：242-248

ISSN号：0022-5193

关键字：Evolutionary game dynamics; Evolution of co-operation; Stochastic dynamics; Fixation events

摘要：An evolutionary dynamic model of 2 x 2 games with finite population of size N+M was built. Among these individuals, N individuals have the same update mechanism as that of the Moran process, while the other M individuals have the same update mechanism as that of the Fermi process. We obtain the balance equations of the fixation probability and analyze some concrete cases. In contrast with the results of neutral evolution, the fixation probability of a single co-operator with the same update mechanism as that of the Fermi process is higher. Besides, more co-operators with the update mechanism of the Fermi process lead to higher fixation probabilities when co-operators' quantity is the same. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.