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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2013-10-16

收录刊物：EI、Scopus

卷号：1

页面范围：618-633

摘要：In this paper, a retailer collecting closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated in centralized and decentralized decisionmaking models. In normal environment without demand disruptions, we find that there is "double marginalization" problem in the decentralized CLSC. For this reason, a quantity discount contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized decision-making CLSC by Kuhn- Tucker condition and linear function methods. Furthermore, we analyze the optimal strategy of centralized CLSC under demand disruptions. We find that the decentralized decisionmaking CLSC can not be coordinated with the original quantity discount. Thus, an adjusted quantity discount contract is proposed to coordinate the decentralized CLSC under demand disruptions. In the end, some numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results.