点击次数：

论文类型： 会议论文

发表时间： 2015-01-01

收录刊物： CPCI-SSH

页面范围： 466-483

关键字： pyramid; bargaining game; the degree of separation of ownership; the control of enterprise value

摘要： In this paper, we used four consecutive years' panel data(from 2009 to 2012) of 2004 Chinese Private Listed Companies for research to test if the ultimate controller and the pyramid structure is prevalent. And we selected the complexity of pyramid and the ability of bargaining game as a start point respectively to study the impact brought about by the separation of ownership, which could help us to seek methods to enhance the value of Chinese private listed companies and promote the healthy development of private enterprises. Our studies have shown that: (1) In Chinese private enterprises, the pyramid structure and the ultimate controller is widespread. The ultimate controller tends to increase the number of levels in the vertical direction and the number of chains in the horizontal direction of the pyramid to promote the complexity of pyramid structure on the spatial structure degree and increase the degree of separation of ownership. (2) Other shareholders can inhibit the the ultimate controller's behavior to reduce the separation of control right and cash flow right. (3) The higher the degree of separation of ownership is, the more easily can the ultimate controller increase encroachment on other shareholders' interests through the complex of pyramid structure and advantages on equity. And thus, the value of the enterprise will reduce.