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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2009-01-01

收录刊物：CPCI-SSH

页面范围：1695-1700

关键字：Over-investment; Executive Compensation; US Investment Banks

摘要：This paper shows that the principal intention of executives to make over-investment is increasing their total profit owing to the theory model of the relationship between executive compensation and over-investment. And then the paper utilizes Principal Components Analysis to establish the comprehensive growth opportunity function of U.S. investment banks and gets the normal investment demand of U.S. banks through analyzing the correlation between sample investment expenditures and comprehensive growth opportunity values, tests that there is over-investment in US investment banks. After that, this paper tests the active correlation between executive compensation and over-investment by establishing liner regression model, and the conclusion is that over-investment volume is what causes CEO compensation to change. At last the paper gives some policy advices directed at over-investment.