个人信息Personal Information
教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
性别:男
毕业院校:东北财经大学
学位:博士
所在单位:经济研究所
学科:产业经济学. 人口、资源与环境经济学. 经济系统分析与管理
办公地点:大连理工大学2号实验楼505房间。
联系方式:手机:13500797045 办公室固定电话:0411-84707230
电子邮箱:yjyuan@dlut.edu.cn
Different Types of Environmental Regulations and Heterogeneous Influence on "Green" Productivity: Evidence from China
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论文类型:期刊论文
发表时间:2017-02-01
发表刊物:ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
收录刊物:SCIE、SSCI、ESI高被引论文、Scopus
卷号:132
页面范围:104-112
ISSN号:0921-8009
关键字:China; "Green" productivity; Environmental regulation; The "strong' Porter Hypothesis; Panel threshold model
摘要:This paper attempts to examine if the "strong" version of Porter Hypothesis is supported in China by investigating how different regulatory instruments and the relative stringency impact "green" productivity. We use a slacks based measure (SBM) and Luenberger Productivity Index, accounting for undesirable outputs, to evaluate the industrial "green" productivity growth rates of China's 30 provinces. The estimates imply an unsustainable development model in China with significant regional differences. By employing a panel threshold model and a province-level panel dataset during 2000-2012, empirical results show that both command-and-control and market-based regulation have a non-linear relationship with and can be positively related to "green" productivity but with different constrains on regulation stringency: there are double thresholds with the command-and control and exists an optimal range of stringency for productivity improvement; while a single threshold has been found with the market-based regulation and its current stringency is reasonable for most of provinces. Moreover, based on China's reality, the productivity effect driven by market-based regulation is much stronger than that of the command-and-control. The mechanism of informal regulation is much more complicated. Consequently, we find evidence to support the "strong" Porter Hypothesis that reasonable stringency of environmental regulations may enhance rather than lower industrial competitiveness. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.