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论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2013-01-01

发表刊物：ICIC Express Letters

收录刊物：EI、Scopus

卷号：7

期号：10

页面范围：2729-2734

ISSN号：1881803X

摘要：The ranking rules of sponsored search auctions are very important for search engines (auctioneers). In this paper, a model of competing auctioneers with various ranking strategy profiles is developed and the equilibrium ranking strategies are analyzed. The advertisers are classified into two types including high-quality ones and low-quality ones. The probabilities that advertisers with different types participate in different auctions and the auctioneers' expected revenues with different ranking strategy profiles are calculated. At last the equilibrium ranking strategies of the competing auctioneers are analyzed by numerical examples. ? 2013 ICIC International.