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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2012-08-20

收录刊物：EI、CPCI-S、Scopus

页面范围：479-484

关键字：Return-oriented programming; hypervisor; privilege escalation; security

摘要：In this paper, we present an approach to attack on the Xen hypervisor utilizing return-oriented programming (ROP). It modifies the data in the hypervisor that controls whether a VM is privileged or not and thus can escalate the privilege of an unprivileged domain (domU) at run time. As ROP technique makes use of existed code to implement attack, not modifying or injecting any code, it can bypass the integrity protections that base on code measurement. By constructing such kind of attack at the virtualization layer, it can motivate further research work towards preventing or detecting ROP attack on the hypervisor.