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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2015-01-01

收录刊物：CPCI-S

页面范围：205-209

关键字：Cooperation; trusted partner; Evolutionary Dynamics; Mixed Strategy; Prisoner's Dilemma

摘要：Social networks have become popular research area in recent years. Evolution of Cooperation on complex networks, which provides a theoretical analysing framework for the social cooperation issue, has also been studied deeply in recent works. In this paper, we investigate evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game when individuals hold mixed strategies instead of pure strategies on cooperative networks. Firstly, the effect of payoff matrix on the average rate of cooperation is studied and we found that the value of the upper threshold of payoff matrix' parameters for high level of cooperation. Secondly, the influence of the strategy-updating probability P is studied. We found it is not conducive to the emergence of cooperation if the value of P is too big or too small. Thirdly, the time step F per round is also studied and we found the system is not conducive to the survival of the cooperator when F is too small. This work may reveal the evolution of cooperation when mixed strategies are adopted and be helpful for understanding cooperative behavior under the environment of complex strategies.