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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2012-10-14

收录刊物：EI、CPCI-S、Scopus

页面范围：416-425

摘要：This paper argues that trust and reputation models should take into account not only direct experiences (local trust) and experiences from the circle of "friends", but also be attack resilient by design in the presence of dishonest feedbacks and sparse network connectivity. We first revisit EigenTrust, one of the most popular reputation systems to date, and identify the inherent vulnerabilities of EigenTrust in terms of its local trust vector, its global aggregation of local trust values, and its eigenvector based reputation propagating model. Then we present EigenTrust(++), an attack resilient trust management scheme. EigenTrust(++) extends the eigenvector based reputation propagating model, the core of EigenTrust, and counters each of vulnerabilities identified with alternative methods that are by design more resilient to dishonest feedbacks and sparse network connectivity under four known attack models. We conduct extensive experimental evaluation on EigenTrust(++), and show that EigenTrust(++) can significantly outperform EigenTrust in terms of both performance and attack resilience in the presence of dishonest feedbacks and sparse network connectivity against four representative attack models.