李明楚

个人信息Personal Information

教授

博士生导师

硕士生导师

主要任职:Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa District

其他任职:开发区校区学术分委员会主任(Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa Campus)

性别:男

毕业院校:多伦多大学

学位:博士

所在单位:软件学院、国际信息与软件学院

学科:软件工程. 运筹学与控制论

办公地点:开发区(Kaifa District Campus)

联系方式:mingchul@dlut.edu.cn

电子邮箱:mingchul@dlut.edu.cn

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Computing Optimal Mixed Strategies for Terrorist Plot Detection Games with the Consideration of Information Leakage

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论文类型:会议论文

发表时间:2017-01-01

收录刊物:CPCI-S

卷号:12

摘要:The terrorist's coordinated attack is becoming an increasing threat to western countries. By monitoring potential terrorists, security agencies are able to detect and destroy terrorist plots at their planning stage. Therefore, an optimal monitoring strategy for the domestic security agency becomes necessary. However, previous study about monitoring strategy generation fails to consider the information leakage, due to hackers and insider threat. Such leakage events may lead to failure of watching potential terrorists and destroying the plot, and cause a huge risk to public security. This paper makes two major contributions. Firstly, we develop a new Stackelberg game model for the security agency to generate optimal monitoring strategy with the consideration of information leakage. Secondly, we provide a double-oracle framework DO-TPDIL for calculation effectively. The experimental result shows that our approach can obtain robust strategies against information leakage with high feasibility and efficiency.