个人信息Personal Information
教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
主要任职:Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa District
其他任职:开发区校区学术分委员会主任(Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa Campus)
性别:男
毕业院校:多伦多大学
学位:博士
所在单位:软件学院、国际信息与软件学院
学科:软件工程. 运筹学与控制论
办公地点:开发区(Kaifa District Campus)
联系方式:mingchul@dlut.edu.cn
电子邮箱:mingchul@dlut.edu.cn
Reputation-based multi-auditing algorithmic mechanism for reliable mobile crowdsensing
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论文类型:期刊论文
发表时间:2018-12-01
发表刊物:PERVASIVE AND MOBILE COMPUTING
收录刊物:SCIE、Scopus
卷号:51
页面范围:73-87
ISSN号:1574-1192
关键字:Mobile crowdsensing; Trust; Auditing mechanism; Truth inference; Lyapunov stability theory
摘要:Mobile crowdsensing has become an efficient paradigm in which crowd workers are recruited to collect data by using their mobile smart phones. However, different workers may provide data with varied degrees of quality. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a reliable crowdsensing system that guarantees the quality of service (QoS) for each task. In this paper, we propose a Reputation-based Multi-Auditing algorithmic mechanism (RMA) by integrating Task-based Temporal Reputation mechanism (TTR) and Reputation-based PM truth inference algorithm (RPM). Further, Performance-Based Payments scheme (PBP) is adopted to promote truthful workers. Based on the past benefits, the behavior of a rational requester may vary over time. Particularly, reinforcement learning and (1-epsilon) accuracy algorithm are used to model the update policy of a requester's strategy. Both rational and irrational workers are considered in this paper. Depending on whether a worker can perceive the benefits of other workers, K-armed bandits and neighborhood learning mechanism are respectively adopted to model the update policy of rational workers. By using Lyapunov stability theory, it is qualitatively proved that the trustful provision of sensed data provides an unique stable evolutionary equilibrium for each rational worker in our proposed system. Finally, extensive simulations and real data experiments illustrate that the RMA mechanism has an outstanding performance on discovering truth and achieving profits. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.