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个人信息Personal Information
教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
主要任职：Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa District
其他任职：开发区校区学术分委员会主任（Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa Campus）
性别：男
毕业院校：多伦多大学
学位：博士
所在单位：软件学院、国际信息与软件学院
学科：软件工程. 运筹学与控制论
办公地点：开发区（Kaifa District Campus）
联系方式：mingchul@dlut.edu.cn
电子邮箱：mingchul@dlut.edu.cn
Optimism when winning and cautiousness when losing promote cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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论文类型：期刊论文
发表时间：2014-08-15
发表刊物：PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
收录刊物：SCIE、EI、Scopus
卷号：408
页面范围：181-189
ISSN号：0378-4371
关键字：Interaction willingness; Imitation-induced adjustment; Cooperation promotion; Prisoner's dilemma
摘要：In real societies, whether an individual participates in unpromising interactions sometimes is a probabilistic option instead of an all-or-nothing option, changing according to the risk of interactions. Inspired by this, we introduce an imitation-induced adjustment mechanism of individual willingness to interact into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where an individual decreases its willingness to interact when it imitates others and increases when it is imitated by others. The adjustment value at each time interval is defined as the adjustment sensitivity of individual willingness to interact. Extensive simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can promote cooperation effectively, and a higher adjustment sensitivity has a more positive influence on the maintenance of cooperation. This promotion is mainly because the survived cooperators can resist the invasion of defectors, through interacting with defectors with lower willingness to interact around them: Finally, the generality of this promotion is testified in two additional scenarios. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.