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论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2018-01-01

发表刊物：INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

收录刊物：SSCI

卷号：22

期号：6

页面范围：532-543

ISSN号：1648-715X

关键字：public-private partnership; early termination; compensation; risk management; Monte Carlo simulation; demand uncertainty

摘要：In the early termination of public-private partnership (PPP) projects, compensation is considered a core issue that greatly affects the interests of the government and the private sector. To address the early termination that is frequently caused by government default or voluntary buyback, this paper proposes an ex-ante compensation mechanism using the cumulative probability that a given demand could be realized to determine early termination compensation under demand uncertainty. By splitting the compensation into two parts, the base compensation could be the minimum compensation for the private sector, while the additional compensation is considered a reasonable allocation of future booming demand. The predetermined compensation criterion ensures a smooth transfer of the early terminated project, which not only benefits the government from being overcharged, but also enables the private sector to gain a reasonable compensation for the remaining concession period.