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论文类型：会议论文

第一作者：Jiao Huaidong

合写作者：Liu Jingjian,Guo Wenli

发表时间：2014-01-01

收录刊物：CPCI-SSH

页面范围：394-399

关键字：debt maturity; executive compensation; stock incentive; impact mechanism

摘要：From the traditional agency theory debt maturity decision is influenced by the relationships between creditors and shareholders, but whether it includes the information of executive incentive compensation? This paper puts forward the impact mechanism of executive compensation structure on debt maturity based on creditors' expectation. With the empirical analysis of listed companies that implemented stock incentive plans from the year 2008 to 2012, results show that, there is a reverse U shape relationship between executive cash compensation and debt maturity, stock option value is positive as well as stock increased, but stock option intensity is opposite, which consistent with research hypotheses. Last, some advices on executive compensation design, credit rating, and how to improve information disclosure are proposed.