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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2019-01-01

收录刊物：EI

页面范围：2763-2768

关键字：Cooperative Behaviors; Cooperative Dilemma; Individual Recognition Model

摘要：Cooperative behavior is common in nature and human society, but it is difficult to appear and maintain in selfish individuals under natural selection. In order to understand and control the cooperative behavior in populations, this paper develops a individual recognition model to analyze and intervene the evolution of the cooperative behavior in populations. Firstly, utilizing the traditional networked evolutionary game and the individual's historical strategy information, the individual recognition model is established. Secondly, through simulating experiment, we use this model to explore some key factors that influence the cooperative level of the population, such as the structure of network, the model's trustworthiness. These results indicate that the model can improve the level of group cooperation. When the model's trustworthiness is low, it can still make the cooperative strategy as a dominant strategy in the group. Finally, the model not only clarifies the reasons for the cooperation in the group from the historical strategy information but also provides another way to solve the cooperative dilemma in populations.