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论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2017-05-01

发表刊物：IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS

收录刊物：SCIE、EI、Scopus

卷号：21

期号：5

页面范围：1091-1094

ISSN号：1089-7798

关键字：Heterogeneous network; hybrid access; incentive pricing mechanism; Stackelberg game

摘要：In this letter, we propose a novel incentive pricing mechanism, where wireless service provider (WSP) offers additional benefits (called bonus) to motivate the adoption of hybrid access in femtocells. The problem is formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game to reach a win-win situation, where WSP determines the pricing policy as the leader and FOs respond as the followers. The optimal proportion of shared resources for each FO and the optimal pricing factor for WSP are decided independently. Furthermore, a Quality of Service (QoS) based admission control scheme is also designed to admit or reject macro users access. Numerical simulations have been conducted and the results show that the utilities of both WSP and FOs are significantly improved due to the exploitation of incentive pricing mechanism.