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Indexed by:会议论文

Date of Publication:2017-01-01

Included Journals:CPCI-S

Volume:12

Abstract:The terrorist's coordinated attack is becoming an increasing threat to western countries. By monitoring potential terrorists, security agencies are able to detect and destroy terrorist plots at their planning stage. Therefore, an optimal monitoring strategy for the domestic security agency becomes necessary. However, previous study about monitoring strategy generation fails to consider the information leakage, due to hackers and insider threat. Such leakage events may lead to failure of watching potential terrorists and destroying the plot, and cause a huge risk to public security. This paper makes two major contributions. Firstly, we develop a new Stackelberg game model for the security agency to generate optimal monitoring strategy with the consideration of information leakage. Secondly, we provide a double-oracle framework DO-TPDIL for calculation effectively. The experimental result shows that our approach can obtain robust strategies against information leakage with high feasibility and efficiency.