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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2008-01-01

收录刊物：CPCI-S

页面范围：10135-10138

关键字：credit risk; game theory; default risk; credit loan relation; moral hazard

摘要：This paper studies the interaction of credit loan game. In our model with subjective and objective dual credit risk, multi-channel financial mode, we present game equilibrium relationship of the enterprise, the non-banking financial institution and the bank. Then we give corresponding investment and financing policies, and in detailed explain following problems such as the impact of the enterprise's absolute risk-aversion degree and bank's loan interest on enterprise's income, the relationship between optimal financing structure and moral hazard, loan interest rate. We give each of the optimal strategies under the game equilibrium condition. Then by empirical analysis we explore the root cause for the financing difficult. Finally, we give some policy suggestions for this point.