秦学志

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教授

博士生导师

硕士生导师

性别:男

毕业院校:大连理工大学

学位:博士

所在单位:金融与会计研究所

学科:投资学. 管理科学与工程

办公地点:经济管理学院D635

联系方式:qinxz@dlut.edu.cn

电子邮箱:qinxz@dlut.edu.cn

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Harmonious and mutual-beneficial credit mechanism and its model

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论文类型:会议论文

发表时间:2008-01-01

收录刊物:CPCI-SSH

页面范围:256-261

关键字:credit risk; game theory; harmonious; moral hazard

摘要:In this paper, we describe a harmonious and mutual-beneficial credit concept in the system of finance. We assume that enterprise takes both equity and debt as its financing ways. Based on models of the game theory, we discuss the relationship between the proportion of enterprise's holding shares and the degree of its absolute risk-aversion. Then we analyze the relationship between the bank's investment utility and degree of enterprise's moral hazard. Finally, the realizing path is presented considering the positive effect of harmonious and mutual-beneficial credit decision-making for whole system.