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论文类型：会议论文

发表时间：2008-09-10

收录刊物：EI、CPCI-S、CPCI-SSH、Scopus

页面范围：1139-+

关键字：game theory; default risk; credit loan relation; moral hazard; investment and financing strategy

摘要：In this paper we study the strategy model of credit loan game based on the Leader follower game theory. We consider different default factor on the subjective and objective dual credit risk. We present the leader-follower game model of the enterprise, the non-banking financial institution and the bank under the multi-channel financial mode, and correspondingly give the investment and financing policies under the game equilibrium condition. Then we in detailed explain following problems such as the impact of the enterprise's absolute risk-aversion degree and bank's loan interest rate on enterprise's income, the relationship between the optimal financing structure and the moral hazard, the loan interest rate. We give each of the optimal strategies under the game equilibrium condition. Finally by empirical analysis we explore the root cause for the financing difficult.