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个人信息Personal Information
教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
主要任职：Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa District
其他任职：开发区校区学术分委员会主任（Director of Academic Committee at Kaifa Campus）
性别：男
毕业院校：多伦多大学
学位：博士
所在单位：软件学院、国际信息与软件学院
学科：软件工程. 运筹学与控制论
办公地点：开发区（Kaifa District Campus）
联系方式：mingchul@dlut.edu.cn
电子邮箱：mingchul@dlut.edu.cn
A dynamic reward-based incentive mechanism: Reducing the cost of P2P systems
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论文类型：期刊论文
发表时间：2016-11-15
发表刊物：KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS
收录刊物：SCIE、EI、Scopus
卷号：112
页面范围：105-113
ISSN号：0950-7051
关键字：Incentive mechanism; Dynamic reward; Replicator dynamics; Evolutionary game
摘要：Reward-based incentive mechanisms are used most commonly to promote cooperation in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Specifically, contributing agents are rewarded by the system. For a centralized P2P system, the central server is responsible for implementing the mechanism and rewarding those cooperative agents. Thus, providing incentives could be costly for the system server. In this paper, we propose a dynamic reward mechanism in which the reward changes accordingly as the system evolves, i.e., when there are more cooperative agents, the reward for each agent decreases, and when there are no free-riders, rewards are no longer needed. Through theoretical analysis using replication dynamics, we determined the evolution stable strategy (ESS) for different scenarios and qualitatively proved that our dynamic reward mechanism can reduce the overall cost of the system. The simulation proved that this dynamic reward mechanism can promote cooperation and reduce the cost of the system. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.