个人信息Personal Information
副教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
性别:女
毕业院校:大连理工大学
学位:博士
所在单位:创新创业学院
学科:应用数学
办公地点:创新创业学院602
联系方式:84707445-6602
电子邮箱:qhpan@dlut.edu.cn
Long deliberation times promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
点击次数:
论文类型:期刊论文
发表时间:2020-01-01
发表刊物:PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
收录刊物:EI、SCIE
卷号:537
ISSN号:0378-4371
关键字:Evolutionary game; Deliberation; Heterogeneity; Cooperation
摘要:Some individuals could be quite cautious when making decisions and do not update their strategy frequently in the prisoner's dilemma game. That is, instead of updating their strategy immediately after the game, they make decisions only after a certain period of deliberation. Moreover, individuals' strategy update is based on the cumulative payoffs they got from their prior update. Since individuals in a group could be homogeneous or heterogeneous, their strategy can depend on two aspects: the initial time of the update and the length of its delay time. In this paper, three different cases that may lead to the delay of strategy update are taken into consideration. We find that introducing a deliberation mechanism can promote cooperation, that this effect could be greater when the delay time is extended, and that heterogeneity among individuals also has a positive effect on cooperation. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.