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论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2020-06-01

发表刊物：PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS

收录刊物：SCIE

卷号：547

ISSN号：0378-4371

关键字：Cooperation; Information asymmetry; Changeable updating rule; Population structure; Public goods game

摘要：Information asymmetry makes individuals rely on different criteria when updating strategies. We combined the Fermi and aspiration process into a changeable process. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on the selection of updating rules and how this affects the evolution of cooperation in public goods game. Our analytical and simulated results indicate that the changeable process indeed can effectively promote cooperation both in well-mixed and structured populations. A striking finding is that the cooperation level is a nonmonotonic function of the aspiration value in the structured population when the social dilemma is weak. Too high probability that individual adopts the aspiration process will impede the evolution of cooperation for low aspiration value. Conversely, it will enhance the evolution of cooperation for high aspiration value. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.