个人信息Personal Information
副教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
性别:女
毕业院校:大连理工大学
学位:博士
所在单位:创新创业学院
学科:应用数学
办公地点:创新创业学院602
联系方式:84707445-6602
电子邮箱:qhpan@dlut.edu.cn
Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game with delayed decisions
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论文类型:期刊论文
发表时间:2013-11-01
发表刊物:CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS
收录刊物:SCIE、EI、Scopus
卷号:56
期号:,SI
页面范围:166-174
ISSN号:0960-0779
摘要:Phenomena that time delays of information lead to delayed decisions are extensive in reality. The effect of delayed decisions on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game is explored in this work. Players with memory are located on a two dimensional square lattice, and they can keep the payoff information of his neighbors and his own in every historic generation in memory. Every player uses the payoff information in some generation from his memory and the strategy information in current generation to determine which strategy to choose in next generation. The time interval between two generations is set by the parameter m. For the payoff information is used to determine the role model for the focal player when changing strategies, the focal player's decision to learn from which neighbor is delayed by m generations. Simulations show that cooperation can be enhanced with the increase of m. In addition, just like the original evolutionary game model (m = 0), pretty dynamic fractal patterns featuring symmetry can be obtained when m > 0 if we simulate the invasion of a single defector in world of cooperators on square lattice. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.