标题：
Breach of Contract and Deposit in BOT Projects
点击次数：
论文类型：
会议论文
收录刊物：
EI、CPCI-S、Scopus
页面范围：
7745-7749
关键字：
moral hazard; limited liability; payoff externality; deposit; contract
efficiency
摘要：
This paper examines the possibility of contractual breach in BOT projects. The main advantage of BOT Scheme is that payoff externality can be internalized through bundling construction and management operations. However, the efficiency of BOT contract is flawed if private company with limited liability intentionally cancels the concession contract. The paper also investigates the deposit policy to deter the strategic breach of contract.
发表时间：
2008-10-12
学位：博士
职称：副教授
学科：工程管理
所在单位：建设管理系