个人信息Personal Information
副教授
博士生导师
硕士生导师
性别:女
毕业院校:大连理工大学
学位:博士
所在单位:创新创业学院
学科:应用数学
办公地点:创新创业学院602
联系方式:84707445-6602
电子邮箱:qhpan@dlut.edu.cn
Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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论文类型:期刊论文
发表时间:2018-02-15
发表刊物:PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
收录刊物:SCIE、EI、Scopus
卷号:492
页面范围:571-581
ISSN号:0378-4371
关键字:Evolution of cooperation; Adaptive interaction; Disconnecting strength
摘要:In this paper, we study the effect of adaptive interaction on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The connections of players are co-evolutionary with cooperation; whether adjacent players can play the prisoner's dilemma game is associated with the strategies they took in the preceding round. If a player defected in the preceding round, his neighbors will refuse to play the prisoner's dilemma game with him in accordance with a certain probability distribution. We use the disconnecting strength to represent this probability. We discuss the evolution of cooperation with different values of temptation to defect, sucker's payoff and disconnecting strength. The simulation results show that cooperation can be significantly enhanced through increasing the value of the disconnecting strength. In addition, the increase in disconnecting strength can improve the cooperators' ability to resist the increase in temptation and the decrease in reward. We study the parameter ranges for three different evolutionary results: cooperators extinction, defectors extinction, cooperator and defector co-existence. Meanwhile, we recruited volunteers and designed a human behavioral experiment to verify the theoretical simulation results. The punishment of disconnection has a positive effect on cooperation. A higher disconnecting strength will enhance cooperation more significantly. Our research findings reveal some significant insights into efficient mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.