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论文类型：期刊论文

发表时间：2018-01-21

发表刊物：JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

收录刊物：SCIE、PubMed

卷号：437

页面范围：1-8

ISSN号：0022-5193

关键字：Evolutionary game dynamics; Evolution of cooperation; Stochastic process; Local information

摘要：In this paper, we propose a strategy-updating rule driven by local information, which is called Local process. Unlike the standard Moran process, the Local process does not require global information about the strategic environment. By analyzing the dynamical behavior of the system, we explore how the local information influences the fixation of cooperation in two-player evolutionary games. Under weak selection, the decreasing local information leads to an increase of the fixation probability when natural selection does not favor cooperation replacing defection. In the limit of sufficiently large selection, the analytical results indicate that the fixation probability increases with the decrease of the local information, irrespective of the evolutionary games. Furthermore, for the dominance of defection games under weak selection and for coexistence games, the decreasing of local information Will lead to a speedup of a single cooperator taking over the population. Overall, to some extent, the local information is conducive to promoting the cooperation. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.