潘秋惠

个人信息Personal Information

副教授

博士生导师

硕士生导师

性别:女

毕业院校:大连理工大学

学位:博士

所在单位:创新创业学院

学科:应用数学

办公地点:创新创业学院602

联系方式:84707445-6602

电子邮箱:qhpan@dlut.edu.cn

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Temptation to defect may promote cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game

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论文类型:会议论文

发表时间:2014-05-30

收录刊物:EI、Scopus

卷号:602-605

页面范围:3783-3786

摘要:In this paper, basing on the prisoner's dilemma model proposed by M.A.Nowak, we present a model to research the action of temptation to defect in prison's dilemma model. Firstly, we determine whether a player changes its strategy depends on a Fermi equation which is related to the payoffs of the player and its neighbors. If the player changes its strategy next time step, it will select the strategy adopted by the one who gets the highest payoff among its neighbors as its own strategy. Form the results we find that when four neighbors are considered, the density of cooperators will present a downtrend. Well, when eight neighbors are considered, the density of cooperators will decline at the beginning and increase suddenly afterwards. When twelve neighbors are considered, if the density of cooperators is reduced to zero, cooperation will appear again. Thus, the increase of temptation to defect may promote cooperation. ? (2014) Trans Tech Publications, Switzerland.